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Understanding the Failure of Participatory Budgeting

Comprendiendo el fracaso del presupuesto participativo

Compreender o fracasso do orçamento participativo

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Pavel Šaradín
Palacký University Olomouc
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0470-5430
pavel.saradin@upol.cz

Markéta Zapletalová
Palacký University Olomouc
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2645-8944
Marketa.zapletalova@upol.cz

Daniela Ostrá
Palacký University Olomouc
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0778-3242
Daniela.ostra@upol.cz

Agnieszka Zogata-Kusz
Palacký University Olomouc
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6152-2182
Agnieszka.zogata@upol.cz

Research Article

Abstract

Participatory budgeting (PB) has become the most widespread democratic innovation in the world, yet research has long focused on successful cases rather than on failures. This study addresses the gap with a configurational analysis of PB termination in Central Europe. Drawing on the literature, we identify five types of factors that contribute to PB failure and consolidate them into three conditions: political-bureaucratic (POL), procedural-technical (PRO), and fiscal (FISC). Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), we examine five cases of failed PB: Mława (Poland); Bratislava, Bratislava–Petržalka, and Ružomberok (Slovakia); and Prague 7 (Czech Republic). Political-bureaucratic failure is present in all five cases, and together with procedural-technical failure it describes four of them. The cases fall into three empirical types of failure: (A) co-optation and hollowing out, (B) fiscal constraints under conditions of political-bureaucratic disengagement, and (C) post-electoral discontinuity. Fiscal constraints did not end PB on their own in any of the cases. We suggest that they reinforce political-bureaucratic failure rather than trigger it, a hypothesis that future large-N studies should test on samples that also include cases where PB continued.

Keywords: democratic innovations, institutional discontinuation, fsQCA, political-bureaucratic conditions, fiscal constraints.

Resumen

El presupuesto participativo (PP) se ha convertido en la innovación democrática más extendida en el mundo; sin embargo, la investigación se ha centrado durante mucho tiempo en los casos exitosos más que en los fracasos. Este estudio aborda esta brecha mediante un análisis configuracional de la interrupción del PP en Europa Central. Basándonos en la literatura, identificamos cinco tipos de factores que contribuyen al fracaso del PP y los agrupamos en tres condiciones: político-burocrática (POL), procedimental-técnica (PRO) y fiscal (FISC). Mediante el Análisis Comparativo Cualitativo de Conjuntos Difusos (fsQCA), examinamos cinco casos de PB fallidos: Mława (Polonia); Bratislava, Bratislava–Petržalka y Ružomberok (Eslovaquia); y Praga 7 (República Checa). El fracaso político-burocrático está presente en los cinco casos y, junto con el fracaso procedimental-técnico, explica cuatro de ellos. Los casos se clasifican en tres tipos empíricos de fracaso: (A) cooptación y vaciamiento, (B) restricciones fiscales en condiciones de desvinculación político-burocrática, y (C) discontinuidad postelectoral. Las restricciones fiscales no pusieron fin por sí solas a la PB en ninguno de los casos. Sugerimos que estas restricciones refuerzan el fracaso político-burocrático en lugar de desencadenarlo, una hipótesis que futuros estudios con un gran número de casos deberían comprobar en muestras que también incluyan casos en los que la PB continuó.

Palabras clave: *innovaciones* democráticas, discontinuidad institucional, fsQCA, condiciones político-burocráticas, restricciones fiscales.

Resumo

O orçamento participativo (OP) tornou-se a inovação democrática mais difundida no mundo; no entanto, as pesquisas têm se concentrado, há muito tempo, em casos de sucesso, em vez de nos fracassos. Este estudo aborda essa lacuna por meio de uma análise configuracional do encerramento do OP na Europa Central. Com base na literatura, identificamos cinco tipos de fatores que contribuem para o fracasso do OP e os agrupamos em três condições: político-burocrática (POL), processual-técnica (PRO) e fiscal (FISC). Utilizando a Análise Comparativa Qualitativa de Conjuntos Fuzzy (fsQCA), examinamos cinco casos de fracasso do PB: Mława (Polônia); Bratislava, Bratislava–Petržalka e Ružomberok (Eslováquia);

e Praga 7 (República Tcheca). O fracasso político-burocrático está presente em todos os cinco casos e, juntamente com o fracasso processual-técnico, descreve quatro deles. Os casos se enquadram em três tipos empíricos de fracasso: (A) cooptação e esvaziamento, (B) restrições fiscais em condições de desengajamento político-burocrático e (C) descontinuidade pós-eleitoral. As restrições fiscais, por si só, não puseram fim à BP em nenhum dos casos. Sugerimos que elas reforçam o fracasso político-burocrático, em vez de desencadeá-lo — uma hipótese que futuros estudos com grande número de casos (N) deveriam testar em amostras que também incluam casos em que a PB continuou.

Palavras-chave: Inovações democráticas, Descontinuidade institucional, fsQCA, Condições político-burocráticas, Restrições fiscais.

Understanding the Failure of Participatory Budgeting

The perception of politics as being in a persistent and deepening crisis, reinforced by the COVID-19 pandemic and its enduring consequences and exacerbated by global instability, declining trust in institutions and established rules, the erosion of the rule of law, the rise of authoritarian tendencies, and the growing influence of polarizing social media, is likely one of the main drivers of citizens' fatigue, apathy, and frustration in liberal democracies. Such attitudes may, in turn, evolve into a broader range of negative emotions that can be channeled into support for populist or extremist political alternatives. Feelings of diminished control and the desire for meaningful political voice pose a significant challenge to the development and consolidation of local communities and an active local civil society, within which citizens may regain influence over important aspects of their lives and engage directly, meaningfully, and relatively easily in collective decision-making processes.

The need for effective citizen participation is reflected in an extensive body of research concerned with improving the quality of democracy through what are commonly conceptualized as democratic innovations (DIs) (Elstub & Escobar, 2019; Escobar & Bua, 2026; Hendriks, 2023; Geissel & Newton, 2012; Saward, 2021; Veri, 2023). Democratic innovations are analyzed at various levels of governance (supranational, national, and subnational); however, the local dimension of innovative democratization, aimed at fostering citizen participation and oversight, is particularly noteworthy. Newton (2012, p. 4) defines DIs broadly as "the successful implementation of a new idea that is intended to change the structures or processes of democratic government and politics in order to improve them." Baiocchi and Ganuza (2016, p. 16) likewise identify democratic innovations with "new participatory devices," which "open a new political context with important effects on democratic performance."

The most prominent and widespread democratic innovation is participatory budgeting (PB). Participatory budgeting, through which citizens help decide how public funds are allocated, has been practiced for more than three decades. Originating in Brazilian cities—with Porto Alegre as the best-known and emblematic example—it has since spread across the globe to countries with markedly different political and institutional settings. Given these diverse contexts, variation in practices, objectives, and expectations is hardly surprising. Whereas the original Brazilian model developed in Porto Alegre emerged within the context of a fragile, newly re-established democracy and was primarily associated with efforts to reduce corruption, patronage, and social exclusion, the Western European context has been characterized by attempts at the "democratization of democracy," that is, by efforts to further strengthen civil society and, more broadly, improve the effectiveness of public governance (Falanga, 2024; Lee, 2023; Ma et al., 2025; Touchton et al., 2023).

Research shows that implementing democratic innovations is not always successful, yet successful cases continue to attract disproportionate academic attention. This tendency has been described by Spada and Ryan (2017, p. 772) as "failure neglect." Many questions in the study of democratic innovations remain unresolved, and our understanding of their specific impacts and long-term sustainability remains limited. A wide range of variables and relations among different types of actors, operating in diverse contexts and at different levels (Theuwis et al., 2025), shape DI outcomes, complicating both measurement and research design. Another important factor concerns the behavior and attitudes of political representatives who declare their willingness to introduce and support democratic innovations.

We argue that the "failure neglect" identified by Spada and Ryan (2017) should be addressed more systematically. Recent scholarship has begun to make progress in this regard by focusing on the critical questions of why, under what circumstances, how, and at what stages democratic innovation processes fail to develop fully, prove unsuccessful, or eventually transform into cases of failure (Hammond, 2020; Ryan, 2021; Soukop et al., 2021).

This trend can be observed particularly clearly in the case of participatory budgeting (PB). In Brazil itself, where participatory budgeting originated, scholars have sought to explain the reasons behind its deterioration and decline. These explanations point to various factors, including political factors (politicization), party-governmental dynamics, technical and institutional factors (particularly the design of procedural arrangements), and fiscal constraints affecting the volume of financial resources available at the local level. As the International Budget Partnership notes, PB processes "work best in the initial years, when scale is still limited and citizens are galvanized by its novel approach" (De Renzio et al., 2019, para. 6).

Over time, however, demands and expectations may increase, giving rise to what some authors describe as “participation fatigue.” This phenomenon occurs when participatory budgeting reaches the limits of its practical capacities, procedural fatigue sets in, and feedback mechanisms weaken or disappear altogether. Together, these factors can have severe consequences, often leading to the eventual discontinuation of PB after only a few years of operation (De Renzio et al., 2019; Wampler & Goldfrank, 2022).

We aim to contribute to the emerging body of research on the causes and contextual factors that lead to the failure of democratic innovations in practice, focusing specifically on participatory budgeting (PB). Our objective is to identify the factors, or combinations of factors, that determine the failure of participatory budgeting processes.

We apply fuzzy-set QCA to several preselected cases of municipalities and city districts in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. The principal criterion for case selection is the existence of a comprehensive dataset demonstrating that (a) participatory budgeting (PB) was introduced and implemented in the given locality, and (b) the PB process was ultimately unsuccessful or failed. The five selected cases are Mława (Poland); Bratislava, Bratislava-Petržalka, and Ružomberok (Slovakia), and Prague 7 (Czech Republic). A common characteristic of the selected cases is that they all involve unsuccessful participatory budgeting processes in municipalities of comparable significance in Central Europe. This region has undergone broadly similar political, social, and cultural developments over the last century. We regard the analysis of failed PB initiatives as a necessary foundation for broader empirical research on failures in the implementation and operation of democratic innovations, particularly within Central Europe and, more broadly, the post-communist context. This research design provides an empirical foundation for more extensive comparative research, including large-N studies.

The article is structured as follows. The first section proceeds in two steps. First, we delimit and define the PB process as employed in this study. Second, drawing on the existing literature, we provide a general classification of potential reasons for failure in participatory budgeting processes and, more broadly, in democratic innovations. The second section outlines the study’s methodological framework. The third section analyzes the selected PB cases. Finally, drawing on these findings, the concluding section discusses the main results.

Explaining the Failures of PB: Towards a General Classification

First, it is necessary to define participatory budgeting (PB) comprehensively. Elstub and Escobar (2019, pp. 25–26) offer one of the most elaborate conceptualizations, classifying participatory budgeting as one of the four "families" of democratic innovations, alongside mini-publics, referenda, and citizens' initiatives, and collaborative governance. They define PB as a process typically associated with the local level and generally open to all residents within a given jurisdiction. Participation is most based on self-selection, although election or purposive selection may also be employed. Voting constitutes the predominant mode of participation, although discursive participation and listening may also play a role. Decisions are generally reached by aggregating preferences and concerns about the allocation of public expenditures. "In terms of level of influence, participatory budgeting tends to place citizens as decision makers, either with direct authority, or in partnership as part of a co-governance arrangement" (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 26).

Sintomer et al. (2008, p. 168) made a significant contribution to refining the definition of participatory budgeting. While defining PB as a process that enables the "participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances," they further specify the concept through five fundamental criteria: (a) finances and/or the budget must be discussed; (b) the process must take place at the city or city-district level, with an elected body and administrative authority (administrative subdivisions without decentralized powers therefore do not meet this criterion); (c) the process must be repeated (a one-off referendum or meeting cannot be considered PB). We further emphasize that participatory budgeting should be conceived as a recurring and institutionalized process. In other words, the expectation of its regular repetition and long-term sustainability should be incorporated into its design from the very beginning; (d) the process requires specific modes and platforms of decision-making beyond existing administrative or representative arrangements (PB involves more than simply inviting citizens to participate in existing local administrative or participatory structures); and (e) accountability for the results of the process is required.

This criteria-based definition, developed by Sintomer et al. (2008), makes a valuable contribution by enabling a distinction between "fake" and genuine participatory budgeting processes. "Fake" PB initiatives may serve various purposes, including political self-promotion, appeasing public demands, or concealing and legitimizing the interests of political actors and their allies. In such cases, democratic innovations may function merely as a "façade" (Spada

& Ryan, 2017, p. 772), lacking substantive effectiveness and serving primarily to create an appearance of legitimacy, give citizens a false sense of involvement, and provide political cover for instrumental or predetermined decisions. “Fake” participatory budgeting initiatives are intentionally designed as façades and serve as instruments for political actors to appropriate democratic innovations. This appropriation is facilitated by the widespread perception that citizen participation is a highly desirable democratic practice. As Baiocchi and Ganuza (2016, p. 3) argue, we live in a “participative age,” characterized by widespread enthusiasm for citizen participation and in which a “remarkable consensus has emerged around its desirability.” Another variant associated with the active involvement of political actors is co-optation. By co-optation, we refer to a process of degeneration in participatory budgeting in which an originally functioning PB design is redefined by political actors to serve their political interests.

This raises the question of how far political representatives are genuinely committed to implementing democratic innovations rather than merely using them as marketing tools. The tension between the representative role of elected officials and the ambition of democratic innovations to enhance the role of citizens has been highlighted by Thompson (2019, p. 255), who argues:

> Regardless of whether one supports a limited or more expansive role for citizens between elections, the ad hoc nature of many democratic innovations suggests that elected representatives do not yet see an ongoing role for democratic innovations as part of representative democracy. (Thompson, 2019, p. 255)

Thompson also highlights the more critical perspective advanced by Walker et al. (2015), who contend that political elites have adapted to the challenges posed by citizen participation and increasingly use participation as a “management tool” rather than a democratization method. In this view, “elite rule is reorganized to accommodate greater openness and participation without disrupting hierarchies and power relations” (Walker et al., 2015, as cited in Thompson, 2019, p. 256). This perspective suggests that democratic innovations may, under certain conditions, serve to reinforce rather than transform existing structures of political power.

In the now classic volume on the evaluation of democratic innovations by Geissel and Newton(2012), Newton identifies several reasons why democratic innovations may produce weak or no effects. First, a democratic innovation may have been implemented poorly, with inappropriate methods or procedures. Second, even when a democratic innovation is proce-

durally and methodologically sound, its outcomes may be effectively "negated" because of politicization, that is, through the influence of interested actors, including governments, parties, or opposing interest groups. Newton also refers to a "placebo effect" of democratic innovations:

> (…) caused not by the innovation itself but simply because the authorities have taken trouble to try to reach out to citizens and express an interest in their opinions. The warm and fuzzy feelings and the belief that things are getting better, even if they are not, may be what research measures, rather than any specific benefit flowing from the specific innovation. (Newton, 2012, p. 13)

If we set aside the category of "fake" democratic innovations, which were not intended from the outset to function as genuinely effective participatory mechanisms, the causes of failure or degeneration of democratic innovations can be divided into several categories. The first two categories are behavioral in nature and concern the actions and attitudes of key actors. In our classification, we label these political and administrative/bureaucratic, as they primarily concern the behavior of elected officials and public administrators. The remaining three categories relate to the institutional framework itself and are classified as procedural, technical, and fiscal. This categorization is grounded in a top-down institutional approach (Allegretti & Stortone, 2014, p. 319; Blas & Ibarra, 2006) and focuses primarily on the processes associated with the political and institutional actors responsible for initiating, designing, and implementing participatory budgeting. These actors remain indispensable, even when citizens and civil society initiate and demand participation through bottom-up processes. The complex configuration of these components decisively influences the participatory dimension of PB operationalization, shaping citizens' attitudes, behavior, and willingness to engage in the process.

As mentioned above, our categorization builds on and synthesizes existing research on democratic innovations and participatory budgeting and proposes the following five categories:

(a) Political: This category corresponds to Newton's notion of the "negation" of the outcomes of otherwise properly designed democratic innovations. It therefore includes failures of democratic innovations resulting from the influence of political or other co-opted interests. It also encompasses the aforementioned disruptive role of "politicization," as observed in the case of participatory budgeting in Brazil, where political support—particularly within polarized systems—may generate complications and lead to a loss of backing as political opposition increases (see also Cabannes, 2004, p. 33). A similar politicization-driven discontinuity has

been observed in other contexts, where opposition parties replacing incumbent governments often lack the willingness or incentives to continue policies (even when they are successful and rational) introduced by their predecessors (Rodgers, 2010). Outcomes may also depend on whether left-wing or non-left-wing parties come to power (Azevedo et al., 2022).

(b) Administrative/bureaucratic: Administrative causes include the failure or degeneration of democratic innovations resulting from the unwillingness or inability of the administrative apparatus responsible for their implementation. This bureaucratic incapacity is not necessarily intentional, as democratic innovations are complex and demanding processes. Local administrations, or administrative bodies at other levels, may not be adequately prepared to implement the required procedures without errors or may lack sufficient motivation to carry them out effectively and consistently.

(c) Procedural: This category encompasses the selection of appropriate methods for the successful implementation of participatory budgeting. As noted above, variability in PB procedures identified by Elstub and Escobar (2019) relates to methods for selecting participants, although self-selection is the dominant mode in PB. This approach has certain limitations, as it tends to result in the participation of individuals already interested in public affairs, particularly those who are more highly educated rather than less educated citizens, and members of middle and upper socioeconomic classes rather than low-income or unemployed groups. These participant characteristics may, in turn, influence the selection of projects that primarily reflect their interests and are concentrated in their residential areas (Featherstone, 2018). Conversely, other parts of the city in which participants do not reside may remain neglected or develop at a significantly slower pace (Soukop et al., 2021, p. 144). In addition, inappropriate voting methods may further undermine the process's effectiveness.

(d) Technical: This category refers primarily to the selection, design, and provision of the technical parameters of the procedures, as well as the technical preparation required to ensure the successful implementation of the participatory budgeting process. It also includes issues such as ensuring citizens' awareness and access to information, as a lack of information or poor information provision can decisively affect outcomes. Furthermore, it encompasses process transparency and the risk of excessive bureaucratization, which may undermine overall implementation effectiveness.

(e) Fiscal: Participatory budgeting is a democratic innovation that is exclusively linked to decisions about budgets and the allocation of public resources. When budgets are limited, smaller-scale projects tend to be prioritized; when financial resources are sufficient, PB may

contribute to more systemic changes within municipalities. This category, therefore, plays a crucial role in determining the success or failure of participatory budgeting processes. Spada (2023) examines the influence of economic factors on participatory budgeting in Brazil; Wampler and Goldfrank (2022) systematically examine this factor, highlighting limited flexibility in financial allocation and economic crises as critical determinants. Alarcón et al. (2019) analyze the impact of economic crises on participatory budgeting, identifying a dual effect: citizens tend to prefer less costly projects, while local governments implement fewer proposals.

Beyond these categories, it is necessary to identify one specific contextual factor that had considerable potential to influence the success or failure of participatory budgeting. This factor was the COVID-19 pandemic, which significantly affected some countries (Bardovič & Gašparík, 2021; Kukučková et al., 2025).

Research Method

To analyze the causes of participatory budgeting failures in the selected cases, we employ the fuzzy-set QCA method (see Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). This choice reflects several considerations about the nature of our research problem. First, the existing literature consistently describes the causes of democratic innovation failures as configurational, meaning no single factor is sufficient to explain them. Moreover, as Spada and Ryan (2017) highlight, the overwhelming focus of existing empirical research on successful "best practices" (with only a small proportion examining discontinued cases) has left our models of democratic innovations overdetermined; explicitly studying failures is therefore necessary to refine these causal theories. The combination of several conditions is therefore crucial (Ryan & Smith, 2012; Spada & Ryan, 2017; Wampler & Goldfrank, 2022). Standard correlational approaches assuming additive effects of variables do not reflect this form of causality; QCA, by contrast, treats conjunctions of conditions as distinct causal pathways (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). Second, causality in PB failure is likely equifinal, with multiple pathways leading to the same outcome (Ryan, 2019; Schiuma, 2025). This is consistent with the Brazilian experience described by Wampler and Goldfrank (2022) and Azevedo et al. (2022), as well as with evidence from Central Europe (Soukop et al., 2021). QCA incorporates equifinality as a fundamental assumption. Third, the relationship between the causes of success and failure is not symmetrical; that is, the absence of factors leading to failure does not automatically constitute the conditions for success, and vice versa. This causal asymmetry is another important feature of QCA that traditional regression approaches are unable to capture (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).

Case Selection

Case selection is based on the logic of the most-similar-systems design: We select cities from the Central European region that have undergone similar political, social, and cultural development over the last century and for which a comparable institutional framework of local self-government can be assumed. The initial screening criteria are as follows:

- An established practice of PB with demonstrable institutional embedding according to the criteria of Sintomer et al. (2008);
- Available empirical evidence covering the entire mechanism from legal establishment to the implementation phase;
- A population of at least 25,000 inhabitants, ensuring the regional relevance of the case.

We also exclude cases in which the termination of PB was primarily conditioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, as it represents an exogenous shock that would complicate the identification of endogenous conditions of failure. Because this study focuses on the dynamics of PB failure, the analysis is limited to cases in which the PB process did not achieve sustained operation. Cases in which PB continued or expanded are deliberately excluded, enabling us to identify the configurations of conditions associated with failure. The implications of this design choice for the interpretation of our findings are discussed in the section on analytical limitations. Before turning to the analysis, it is also important to acknowledge that the amount of empirical evidence available varies somewhat across cases. Although we do not consider these differences substantial enough to undermine the validity of the comparison, we take them into account during the calibration process, when assigning membership scores for the conditions and the outcome (Y). Specifically, for cases with more limited documentation, we adopted a more conservative approach when assigning higher membership scores. The five cases selected for analysis include the city of Mława in Poland, Bratislava, Bratislava-Petržalka, and Ružomberok in Slovakia, and Prague 7 in the Czech Republic.

Operationalization of the Outcome

The outcome (Y) is conceptualized as the failure of the participatory budgeting process. By this term, we refer to three empirically distinguishable yet theoretically related situations:

- Transformation of PB because of political negation as defined by Newton (2012): failures of democratic innovations resulting from the influence of political or other co-opted interests and dynamics of politicization;

- Discontinuity following a period of actual operation, whereby the process is abandoned after one or several cycles;
- De facto termination despite formal retention, manifested in either a zero allocation of resources or the absence of deliberation.

We combine these definitions into a single outcome because all three situations result in the loss of PB as a functioning democratic innovation; however, their qualitative differences are reflected in the descriptions of the individual types of failure.

Operationalization of the Conditions

From our typology of five causes of failure, we derive three theoretically grounded conditions that capture the principal mechanisms identified in the literature.

POL: Political-Bureaucratic Condition

This condition captures the behavior of political actors and the responsiveness of the administrative apparatus: failure or absence of political will for decision-makers, co-optation of PB by political actors and redefinition of PB to serve political interests, loss of political support following a change in local government, and unwillingness or inability of municipal administrators to implement PB effectively (as seen in many European consultative models that lack genuine empowered participatory governance; see Sintomer et al., 2008). It draws on the arguments of Thompson (2019) and Walker et al. (2015) concerning the tension between the representative role of elected officials and the strengthening of citizens' roles, as well as on the Brazilian evidence on the politicization of PB (Azevedo et al., 2022; Wampler & Goldfrank, 2022).

PRO: Procedural-Technical Condition

This condition captures procedural and technical shortcomings in the design and implementation of PB. These include inappropriate procedures, such as winner-takes-all allocation, which creates "too many ´losers´" and may discourage future participation (Spada, 2019, p. 172); restrictions on eligible projects; and poorly designed voting arrangements (Wampler, 2007). It also covers technical aspects of the process, including insufficient promotion, which can undermine large-scale democratic innovations by leaving much of the public unaware of the process (Ardanaz et al., 2023; Ryan & Smith, 2012); inadequate information provision

that depends on overly complex materials and places high demands on participants (Azevedo et al., 2022; Lightbody & Roberts, 2019), and poorly planned timing or demanding schedules that can lead to participant fatigue (Azevedo et al., 2022; Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

FISC: Fiscal Condition

This condition captures the structural underfunding of the budget allocated to PB, including situations in which resources are not allocated at all. It draws on Alarcón et al. (2019) and Wampler and Goldfrank (2022), who identify fiscal capacity as a critical factor in the sustainability of PB. The conceptualization of this condition is also supported by existing QCA applications to democratic innovations, which consistently test financial capacity (such as the availability of discretionary funds for new capital investment and municipal fiscal independence) as a core explanatory factor for the success and institutionalization of PB (Ryan & Smith, 2012; Schiuma, 2025; Wampler, 2007). As Wampler (2007) notes, limited spending capacity fundamentally undermines programs that delegate authority to citizens.

Calibration

We calibrate the three conditions and the outcome using a four-value fuzzy-set scale. A score of 1 indicates full membership, 0.67 indicates that a case is more in the set than out of it, 0.33 indicates that it is more out of the set than in it, and 0 indicates full non-membership. We do not assign a score of 0.5 because it represents the crossover point between membership and non-membership (Cangialosi, 2023; Fiss, 2011; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Cases at this threshold cannot be included in the sufficiency analysis.

Calibration was based on the empirical evidence available for each case. POL and PRO each combine two sub-dimensions, which we first assessed separately and then combined using the aggregation rule in Appendix 1 (Table A1). We assessed each case individually and assigned membership scores according to the strength and consistency of the available evidence. When the evidence supported more than one plausible score, we opted for the more conservative calibration and explain the reasoning behind that decision in the corresponding case commentary.

Table 1 summarizes how the qualitative assessments reported in the results matrix were translated into fuzzy-set membership scores.

Table 1

Calibration Key

Verbal Assessment in the Matrix	Membership Score
Condition fully present	1.00
Condition strongly present, but not at full intensity	0.67
Condition present only partially or in a limited manifestation	0.33
Condition absent or present only to a negligible extent	0.00

Analysis

The analysis is conducted in two steps that are standard in fuzzy-set QCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). First, we examine the necessity of individual conditions. That is, condition X is a necessary condition for outcome Y if the occurrence of Y without X is not observed. The consistency of necessity is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the minima of the pairs (membership in the condition, membership in the outcome) to the sum of membership scores in the outcome. A condition is considered necessary if its consistency is at least 0.90 (Li et al., 2025; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

In the second step, we analyze sufficiency by examining whether a particular combination of conditions consistently leads to the outcome. For sufficient combinations, we report two indicators. Consistency expresses the degree to which cases exhibiting a given combination belong to the outcome (formally, it is the ratio of the sum of the minima of the pairs consisting of membership in the configuration and membership in the outcome to the sum of membership scores in the combination). Coverage expresses the proportion of membership in the outcome explained by a given combination; that is, the same numerator divided by the sum of membership scores in the outcome (Ragin, 2006).

Calibrated Values

Applying the calibration key to the five cases of failure produced the fuzzy-set scores presented in Table 2. Detailed justifications for the individual scores are provided in the appendix to this study.

Table 2

Calibrated Fuzzy-Set Scores

Case	POL	PRO	FISC	Y (Failure)
Mława	1.00	0.67	1.00	1.00
Bratislava	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Ružomberok	1.00	0.33	1.00	1.00
Prague 7	1.00	1.00	0.33	1.00
Bratislava-Petržalka	1.00	0.67	0.00	1.00

The calibrated data indicate that the condition POL attains full membership (1.00) in all five cases. Political-bureaucratic failure therefore constitutes a common feature across all cases examined. In contrast, PRO and FISC vary considerably: PRO ranges from 0.33 (Ružomberok) to 1.00 (Bratislava, Prague 7), while FISC ranges from 0.00 (Bratislava-Petržalka) to 1.00 (Mława, Bratislava, and Ružomberok). This distribution foreshadows an important finding: the political-bureaucratic dimension represents a constant across cases, whereas the procedural-technical and fiscal dimensions define qualitatively distinct types of failure.

The case of Prague 7 exhibits full membership in the outcome set (Y = 1.00). The subsequently introduced school participatory budgeting program (providing only EUR 2,000 per school, approximately EUR 16,000 in total) does not constitute a comparable continuation of the municipal participatory budgeting process as a form of citizen participation. Rather, it represents a substitute mechanism aimed at a different target group and operating with a substantially lower budget allocation.

Necessity Analysis

Table 3

Necessity Consistency Scores for Individual Conditions

Conditions	Consistency of Necessity
POL	1.00
PRO	0.73
FISC	0.67

The analysis identifies POL with a necessity consistency score of 1.00. This value reflects the fact that the political-bureaucratic dimension of failure is present at full intensity in all five analyzed cases. POL therefore qualifies as a formally necessary condition within the examined sample. Given that the study includes only cases of participatory budgeting (PB) failure, the perfect necessity consistency of POL indicates the universal presence of this condition across cases in which PB failed, rather than supporting a strong causal claim that failure would not have occurred in the absence of POL.

The condition PRO achieves a necessity consistency score of 0.73. This value falls well below the conventional threshold of 0.90 commonly used to infer necessity (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Procedural-technical failure therefore does not constitute a necessary condition in the cases under investigation, as some failures occur when this dimension is not fully present (most notably Ružomberok, with a PRO score of 0.33). Thus, procedural-technical failure may function as an accompanying factor rather than as an independent trigger of participatory budgeting failure.

The condition FISC, with a necessity consistency score of 0.67, likewise does not qualify as a necessary condition. Even in cases where budget allocations were low (approximately EUR 1 per capita in Prague 7 and a comparable amount in Bratislava-Petržalka), the immediate trigger for the termination of participatory budgeting was political-bureaucratic decisions rather than fiscal constraints. This finding weakens the assumption that financial factors constitute the primary driver within the causal structure of participatory budgeting failure.

Sufficiency Analysis

We test sufficiency for two configurations, POL*PRO and the extended POL*PRO*FISC. In line with standard QCA notation, an asterisk marks the logical AND and a tilde marks the absence of a condition. Table 4 reports the results.

Table 4

Consistency and Coverage of Sufficient Configurations

Configuration	Consistency	Coverage
POL*PRO	1.00	0.73
POL*PRO*FISC	1.00	0.47

The configuration POL*PRO achieves a sufficiency consistency score of 1.00, exceeding the conventional threshold of 0.80 (Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). When political-bureaucratic failure occurs alongside fully or substantially present procedural-technical failure, participatory budgeting can be terminated. This conclusion applies to four of the five cases under investigation: Mława, Bratislava, Prague 7, and Bratislava-Petržalka.

The fifth case, Ružomberok, exhibits only a low degree of membership in PRO (0.33) and therefore does not clearly belong to this configuration. Its failure followed a different causal pathway, which is described in the Typology of Failure Combinations section as Combination B.

POL*PRO has a coverage of 0.73. This means that the configuration accounts for most, but not all, of the membership in the outcome. In fsQCA, coverage is calculated from membership scores rather than from the number of cases. The uncovered part (1.33) comes mostly from Ružomberok, which belongs to POL*PRO only at 0.33 and accounts for 0.67 of the gap. Mława and Bratislava–Petržalka add 0.33 each, because they belong to the configuration at 0.67 rather than fully. In practical terms, the joint presence of political–bureaucratic and procedural–technical failure describes four of the five cases well. Ružomberok is the exception, and its failure followed a different path, discussed in Section 3.4 as Combination B.


When FISC is added, consistency stays at 1.00 and coverage falls to 0.47. The consistency value tells us little here. All five cases are full members of the outcome, so every configuration reaches a consistency of 1.00 in this sample, and coverage is the more useful measure. The lower coverage shows that fiscal problems are not shared across the failed cases. They appear together with POL and PRO in Mława and Bratislava and without PRO in Ružomberok. They are absent in Prague 7 and Bratislava–Petržalka, where PB ended all the same. In our cases, fiscal failure never occurs without political–bureaucratic failure and never accounts for termination on its own. We read this as a sign that fiscal constraints may reinforce political–bureaucratic failure. Since the study includes only failed cases, this reading cannot be tested here and remains a proposition for further research.

Typology of Failure Combinations

Based on the analyzed configurations, we derive three empirically supported combinations that lead to the termination of participatory budgeting. For visual reference, Figure 1 maps the five cases under investigation onto configurations of the three conditions POL, PRO, and FISC. The cases are positioned in the diagram according to dichotomized values (with the presence of a condition corresponding to a score > 0.5). The visualization shows that all cases are located within the set POL, consistent with the finding that this condition is present in all five cases. It also demonstrates that the three observed configurations correspond to the three types of failure identified in our typology.

Figure 1

Mapping of Cases onto Combinations of POL, PRO, and FISC



*Combination A—Co-optation and Hollowing Out (Mława, Bratislava): POL*PRO *FISC*

This combination differs from the other two in several respects. It is the only one in which all three conditions are strongly present (Table 2), and the only one where PB did not decline through neglect but was actively reshaped by political actors. In both Mława and Bratislava, local leaders retained the participatory budgeting process but gradually altered its purpose. In Mława, binding decisions were replaced with non-binding consultations, while in Bratislava the municipality avoided adopting a formal statute and increasingly shifted participation from public meetings to online voting. These procedural changes were not simply signs of poor implementation. Instead, they reduced opportunities for meaningful deliberation and gave political actors greater control over the process. Limited funding reinforced this trajectory, but it was not the main driver of failure. Rather, it strengthened a process whose original participatory function had already been substantially weakened.

Combination B—Fiscal Constraints Under Conditions of Political-Bureaucratic Disengagement (Ružomberok): POL~ PRO*FISC*

Ružomberok differs from the other cases in one important respect: it is the only case with low membership in PRO (0.33; Table 2). Unlike Mława, Bratislava, Prague 7, and Bratislava-Petržalka, the termination of PB in this case cannot be attributed to major procedural or technical changes. Instead, the process gradually lost institutional support. While Combination A reflects political actors actively reshaping PB, Ružomberok represents political and administrative disengagement. The municipality did not formally redesign or restrict the process; instead, PB was gradually neglected, remained off the municipal council's agenda, operated with a frozen budget, and eventually disappeared altogether. This case therefore shows that termination does not always result from manipulating participatory procedures. Under conditions of limited political attention and declining financial support, PB can also fade away without substantial procedural intervention.

Combination C—Post-electoral Discontinuity (Prague 7, Bratislava-Petržalka): POL PRO* ~FISC*

Combination C shares an important feature with Combination A: in both cases, PB ended in the presence of political-bureaucratic and procedural-technical problems. The difference is that, in these two cases, financial constraints did not play a meaningful role in the process of decline. Instead, the turning point was a change in political leadership after local elections.

In Prague 7, the newly elected leadership decided to discontinue PB, while in Bratislava-Petržalka the incoming administration did not continue the process and gradually allowed it to disappear from the local agenda.

These cases differ from Combination A because PB was not redesigned or adapted to serve a different purpose. No one tried to reshape the process; it was simply discontinued. Comparing these two pathways shows that similar conditions can lead to different forms of failure. While Combination A reflects a situation in which PB was retained but altered by political actors, Combination C represents a situation in which the process lost political support and ended.

Limitations of the Analysis

Several limitations must be considered when interpreting the results. First, the inclusion of five cases means that out of the eight logically possible configurations of three binary conditions, only three are observed. The remaining five configurations are logical remainders, and our sufficiency conclusions apply only to the empirical sample rather than to the full combinatorial space. This limitation is consistent with the study's design, which is conceived as an empirical basis for future large-N comparative research.

Second, the study includes only cases of participatory budgeting failure. This design choice is theoretically motivated by the call to systematically address "failure neglect" (Spada & Ryan, 2017), but it has specific inferential implications. In the absence of cases of continuity, it is not possible to formally test whether the identified configurations lead to failure or whether they are merely present in selected cases of failure. In particular, the necessity consistency of POL at 1.00 does not constitute a strong causal claim about necessity; rather, it reflects the fact that this condition is fully present in all five selected cases. The sufficiency analysis, therefore, primarily serves as a description of shared characteristics of failed cases rather than as a test of causal claims. This methodological status is reflected in the formulation of the findings, where causal language is deliberately avoided.

Third, calibration in QCA is based on interpretive decisions by the researcher. In cases with less extensive documentation, we applied more conservative thresholds when assigning higher membership scores. Detailed justifications of all values in the Appendix ensure the transparency of this process.

Conclusions

The analysis of five cases of unsuccessful participatory budgeting in Central Europe empirically confirms the assumption that democratic innovations fail for more than one reason. Rather, such failures arise from specific combinations of factors. In the introductory section, we identified five principal categories that may contribute to participatory budgeting failures. For the empirical analysis, these categories were consolidated into three broader conditions.

The political-bureaucratic condition (POL) is present at full intensity in all five cases (necessity consistency = 1.00). Given that the analysis focuses exclusively on cases of municipalities and city districts in which participatory budgeting failed, POL does not, by itself, demonstrate causal necessity. Rather than functioning as an independent causal trigger, the condition appears to operate as a consistently present background factor accompanying the failure of participatory budgeting.

The procedural-technical (PRO) and fiscal (FISC) conditions are not present in all cases (necessity consistency of 0.73 and 0.67). The sufficiency analysis shows that the combination POL*PRO describes four of the five cases well (consistency = 1.00, coverage = 0.73). When FISC is added, coverage drops to 0.47, because fiscal problems were absent in two of the cases. Placing the cases on the three conditions gives three empirical types of failure: (A) co-optation and hollowing out (Mława, Bratislava); (B) fiscal constraints under conditions of political-bureaucratic disengagement (Ružomberok); and (C) post-electoral discontinuity (Prague 7, Bratislava–Petržalka).

The fiscal condition did not lead to termination on its own in any of the cases. It always appeared together with political-bureaucratic failure, and in Prague 7 and Bratislava–Petržalka PB ended even though fiscal problems were absent. We therefore suggest that fiscal constraints reinforce political-bureaucratic failure rather than trigger it. Because the study includes only failed cases, this is a hypothesis that future large-N research should test on a sample that also includes municipalities where PB continued. The finding builds on earlier work on the fiscal side of PB (e.g., Alarcón et al., 2019; Soukop et al., 2021; Wampler & Goldfrank, 2022).

Although this study is limited to Central Europe, some shortcomings of participatory budgeting (PB), or the erosion of its substance, have also been identified in the Brazilian context (Wampler & Goldfrank, 2022). In the case of Porto Alegre, research has identified institutional decay compounded by fiscal constraints on PB and declining political commitment, leading

to the disruption of the model that inspired PB on a global scale. Post-electoral discontinuity, in turn, corresponds to findings from the municipal context in Brazil, where changes in local government leadership led to the termination of PB (Azevedo et al., 2022). The findings show that the identified political-bureaucratic, procedural-technical, and fiscal conditions extend beyond Central Europe, and that the problems associated with PB are global in nature. The study's conclusions can thus be replicated beyond the Central European context.

Appendix 1

Justification of calibration and intermediate calculations

This appendix supplements the study with a brief justification of fuzzy-set values for each of the five cases, including references to empirical evidence, as well as intermediate calculations of necessity and sufficiency consistency for the identified combinations.

Aggregation rule for two-component conditions

POL and PRO each combine two sub-dimensions (POL: political-participatory and administrative-bureaucratic; PRO: procedural and technical), whereas FISC is a single-component condition. The degree of presence of both sub-dimensions is converted into the resulting condition value according to the rule presented in Table A1. The rule follows a conservative logic of the calibration key; the value "fully present" applies to situations in which both sub-dimensions exhibit a significant failure.

Table A1

Aggregation rule for two sub-dimensions into the resulting condition value

Profile of two sub-dimensions	Condition value
Both sub-dimensions fully present	1,00
One sub-dimension fully present, the other at least partially present	1,00
One sub-dimension fully present, the other absent or negligibly present	0,67
Both sub-dimensions partially present	0,67
One sub-dimension partially present, the other absent or negligibly present	0,33
Both sub-dimensions absent or negligibly present	0,00

Justification of case-specific calibration

Table A2 summarizes the calibrated values; these are subsequently justified in detail.

Table A2

Calibrated fuzzy scores

Case	POL	PRO	FISC	Y
Mława	1,00	0,67	1,00	1,00
Bratislava	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00
Ružomberok	1,00	0,33	1,00	1,00
Praha 7	1,00	1,00	0,33	1,00
Bratislava-Petržalka	1,00	0,67	0,00	1,00

Mława

POL = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The political-participatory sub-dimension is only partially present. The decision to introduce PB was adopted unanimously by the city council in 2015, receiving 19 votes in favor, and Mayor S. Kowalewski publicly supported the initiative[1]. Political failure became apparent only at a later stage: in May 2019, the Deputy Mayor stated that municipalities of Mława's size were not legally required to implement PB[2], and it was subsequently terminated in August 2019[3]. The administrative-bureaucratic sub-dimension is fully present: The heritage conservation authority rejected permits for the mini salt towers—structures designed to enrich the air with saline aerosols—on three occasions; public procurement procedures repeatedly failed to attract bids; and the economic committee significantly underestimated the construction costs of the saline park. Of the four winning projects, only two were ultimately implemented. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension fully present and the other partially present" corresponds to a condition value of 1.00.

PRO = 0.67 (condition substantially present, but not at full intensity)

The procedural sub-dimension is fully present. The winner-takes-all rule meant that the most expensive winning project consumed the entire budget of EUR 70,000[4], thereby preventing the implementation of the remaining projects. The technical sub-dimension is only partially present. Voting was accessible and was gradually improved over time, including the reduction of the minimum voting age from 18 to 16 years. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension fully present and the other partially present" corresponds to a condition value of 0.67.

1 Protokół Nr VIII/2015 z obrad sesji Rady Miasta z dnia 30 czerwca 2015r. | Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej Urzędu Miasta Mława
2 protokoł z VIII sesji.pdf
3 Protokoł z X sesji.pdf
4 PROTOKÓŁ Nr V z 22.01.2019 r. do bip.pdf

FISC = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The budget allocation remained fixed at EUR 70,000 throughout all four editions (2015–2018), with no increase in response to growing demand, indicating structural underfunding.

Y = 1.00 (outcome fully present)

In August 2019, the municipality formally terminated the participatory budgeting.

Bratislava

POL = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The political-participatory sub-dimension is fully present. The city council repeatedly rejected the Framework Concept of Participatory Budgeting prepared by a civic association, while the financial allocations for PB remained substantially below the amounts promised by Mayor Ftáčnik (EUR 30,000 instead of EUR 100,000 in the first edition and EUR 46,000 in the third edition).[5] The administrative-bureaucratic sub-dimension is also fully present. The PB statute was never formally adopted; a number of approved citizen projects were either not implemented or implemented only partially; and in some cases, citizens were not compensated for the work they had carried out. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "both sub-dimensions fully present" corresponds to a condition value of 1.00.

PRO = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The procedural sub-dimension is fully present. The city council insisted on online voting as the decisive component of the process, rather than public deliberative forums, thereby circumventing the deliberative logic of participatory budgeting. The technical sub-dimension is only partially present. Online voting lacked safeguards against multiple voting, and public outreach remained inadequate despite repeated demands from the civic platform. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension fully present and the other partially present" corresponds to a condition value of 1.00.

FISC = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The declared target of allocating 1% of the municipal budget (approximately EUR 2 mi-

5 *Bratislava participatory budget: Case study report & analysis.* Utopia. https://www.participativni-rozpocet.cz/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/REPORT_BRATISLAVA_PB.pdf

llion) was met only to the extent of roughly 2.3% of the declared amount (EUR 46,000), representing a ratio of approximately 1:43.

Y = 1.00 (outcome fully present)

The process formally continued only in a form that the civic platform itself regarded as illegitimate.

Ružomberok

POL = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The political-participatory sub-dimension is only partially present. Initially, participatory budgeting enjoyed political support: in December 2012, Mayor Pavlík approved a pilot allocation of EUR 5,000, and the city council formally endorsed the PB initiative. Following the 2014 local elections, however, the new municipal leadership showed little interest in continuing the process and rejected citizens' demands for the adoption of formal PB rules. The administrative-bureaucratic sub-dimension is fully present throughout the 2013–2015 period.[6] PB lacked any formal institutional framework (no directive or formal regulation was adopted), operated on an ad hoc basis through the sub-accounts of two municipal departments, and municipal officials themselves acknowledged that they were often uncertain about how to proceed with certain administrative tasks. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension fully present and the other partially present" corresponds to a condition value of 1.00.

PRO = 0.33 (condition only partially present)

The procedural sub-dimension is only partially present. Although the methodology incorporated several innovative features—including a participatory methodology, thematic working groups, and decentralization—it lacked formal procedures and systematic evaluation of the voting process. The technical sub-dimension is also only partially present, as the initiative received minimal media coverage and was not supported by any systematic promotional campaign. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension partially present and the other absent or negligibly present" corresponds to a condition value of 0.33.

FISC = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The PB was structurally underfunded, receiving only EUR 5,000 annually during the three

6 https://www.dvepercenta.sk/mala-asignacia/2019/05/03/ruzomberok-sk/

editions held between 2013 and 2015 (reduced to EUR 4,500 in 2014). Civic initiatives themselves described this amount as demotivating.

Y = 1.00 (outcome fully present)

In 2016, participatory budgeting "quietly disappeared" without any formal decision to terminate it.[7]

Praha 7

POL = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The political-participatory sub-dimension is fully present. Although PB initially enjoyed the support of a majority of parties represented in the municipal council, the new governing coalition led by Mayor J. Čižinský discontinued the process in its original form following the 2014 local elections[8], citing a lack of citizen interest. The administrative-bureaucratic sub-dimension is only partially present. The rules governing PB were adopted with a delay, only after the beginning of the fiscal year, and the process received virtually no public promotion. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension fully present and the other partially present" corresponds to a condition value of 1.00.

PRO = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The procedural sub-dimension is fully present. Participation was restricted exclusively to investment projects, while voting was open for only 11 days and could be conducted solely in person at three designated locations. The technical sub-dimension is only partially present. Minimal promotion resulted in participation by only 0.22% of eligible voters (66 out of 30,624)[9]. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension fully present and the other partially present" corresponds to a condition value of 1.00.

FISC = 0.33 (condition only partially present)

The allocation of EUR 40,000 for 2014 amounted to approximately EUR 0.9 per capita, the lowest level among Prague municipal districts (other districts allocated between EUR

7 https://www.dvepercenta.sk/mala-asignacia/2019/05/03/ruzomberok-sk/

8 Soukop, M., Šaradín, P., & Zapletalová, M. (2021). *Participatory budgeting: A case study of possible causes of failure*. Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, 21(2), 139–160, https://doi.org/10.34135/sjps.210202

9 https://alternativazdola.cz/praha-7-vysledky-hlasovani-o-vyuziti-participativni-casti-rozpoctu/

1.1 and EUR 5.5 per capita). This represented a psychologically insufficient allocation rather than a critically underfunded budget, as the available funds were sufficient to implement the winning project.

Y = 1.00 (outcome fully present)

Participatory budgeting as a citywide process ended in 2016. The school budgets introduced afterwards (EUR 2,000 per school per year) should not be regarded as a continuation of that process under a different label. They served a different target group (pupils rather than the general public), operated with only a small fraction of the original budget, and were not presented by the district as a replacement for the citywide participatory budgeting program. Nor did we find any evidence that participants in the original process could continue their involvement through the school scheme. We therefore treat the citywide participatory budgeting process as having ended in 2016.

Bratislava-Petržalka

POL = 1.00 (condition fully present)

The political-participatory sub-dimension is fully present. The municipal leadership never fully embraced participatory budgeting and formally terminated the process in 2016[10], citing its administrative and time demands. The administrative-bureaucratic sub-dimension is only partially present, as the process was hindered by lengthy bureaucratic procedures and property-rights issues related to the land on which projects were to be implemented. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension fully present and the other partially present" corresponds to a condition value of 1.00.

PRO = 0.67 (condition substantially present, but not at full intensity)

The procedural sub-dimension is fully present. Participatory budgeting had a distinctly top-down character, with the municipal administration determining both the thematic areas of voting (e.g., green spaces and playgrounds) and the specific locations from which citizens could choose, rather than allowing citizens to propose projects themselves.[11] The technical

10 https://www.petrzalka.sk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Infomaterial_Vyhodnotenie_prioritnych_cielov.pdf

11 Vittek, P. (2013). Pokusy o zavedenie participatívneho rozpočtu na Slovensku. In K. Silná (Ed.), *Rozhodujme o svém městě: Participativní rozpočet jako aktivní zapojení občanů a občanek do rozhodování: Sborník konference* (pp. 32–38). Ekumenická akademie Praha. http://www.socialwatch.cz/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Sbornik_konference_PR.pdf, p. 36.

sub-dimension is only partially present, as online voting functioned without major technical problems. According to the aggregation rule, the configuration "one sub-dimension fully present and the other partially present" corresponds to a condition value of 0.67.

FISC = 0.00 (condition absent or negligibly present)

The budget allocation increased from EUR 20,000 in 2013 to EUR 30,000[12] in subsequent years. Relative to the pilot nature of the process, the budget cannot be considered objectively insufficient, and fiscal constraints played no role in the decision to terminate it. The explicitly stated reason for termination was administrative burden rather than a lack of financial resources.

Y = 1.00 (outcome fully present)

In 2016, participatory budgeting was formally terminated, and participatory funding was subsequently transferred to primary schools.

Calculation of necessity consistency

Necessity consistency is calculated as the sum of the minima, *min(X, Y)*, across all cases divided by the sum of the outcome values *(Y)*. Table A3 presents the complete intermediate calculations.

Table A3

Calculation of necessity consistency for POL, PRO and FISC

Case	POL	PRO	FISC	Y	min(POL,Y)	min(PRO,Y)	min(FISC,Y)
Mława	1,00	0,67	1,00	1,00	1,00	0,67	1,00
Bratislava	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00
Ružomberok	1,00	0,33	1,00	1,00	1,00	0,33	1,00
Praha 7	1,00	1,00	0,33	1,00	1,00	1,00	0,33
Petržalka	1,00	0,67	0,00	1,00	1,00	0,67	0,00
Σ				**5**	**5**	**3,67**	**3,33**

Consistency: POL = 5 / 5 = 1,00; PRO = 3,67 / 5 = 0,73; FISC = 3,33 / 5 = 0,67.

Calculation of sufficiency consistency

Table A4 presents the case-level values for the three analyzed configurations: POL ~ PRO, POL ~ FISC, and POL ~ PRO ~ FISC. The fuzzy-set score of each configuration is determined by the minimum value of its constituent conditions for a given case. Sufficiency

12 https://www.petrzalka.sk/2013-04-15-o-pouziti-financii-rozhoduju-aj-obyvatelia/

consistency is calculated as the sum of *min(configuration, Y)* divided by the sum of the configuration scores. Coverage is calculated as the same numerator divided by the sum of the outcome values *(Y)*.

Table A4

Intermediate calculations for the three analyzed configurations

Case	POL~PRO	min(~,Y)	POL~FISC	min(~,Y)	POL~PRO~FISC	min(~,Y)
Mława	0,67	0,67	1,00	1,00	0,67	0,67
Bratislava	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00
Ružomberok	0,33	0,33	1,00	1,00	0,33	0,33
Praha 7	1,00	1,00	0,33	0,33	0,33	0,33
Petržalka	0,67	0,67	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Σ	**3,67**	**3,67**	**3,33**	**3,33**	**2,33**	**2,33**

Σ(Y) = 5.

POL ~ PRO: consistency = 3,67 / 3,67 = 1,00; coverage = 3,67 / 5 = 0,73.

POL ~ FISC: consistency = 3,33 / 3,33 = 1,00; coverage = 3,33 / 5 = 0,67.

POL ~ PRO · FISC: consistency = 2,33 / 2,33 = 1,00; coverage = 2,33 / 5 = 0,47.

Summary of analyzed measures

Table A5

Summary of necessity and sufficiency consistency

Condition / Configuration	Necessity consistency	Sufficiency consistency	Coverage
POL	1,00	—	—
PRO	0,73	—	—
FISC	0,67	—	—
POL ~ PRO	—	1,00	0,73
POL ~ FISC	—	1,00	0,67
POL ~ PRO ~ FISC	—	1,00	0,47

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About the authors

Pavel Šaradín

He works as an associate professor at the Department of Politics and European Studies, Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic. He teaches mainly the theory of democracy, local politics, and political thought. He is the editor and co-author of the monograph *Challenging Citizens: Democratic Innovations at the Local Level* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023). He is engaged in promoting participatory methods in the Czech Republic.

Markéta Zapletalová

She teaches at the Department of Politics and European Studies at Palacký University Olomouc. Her research focuses on European politics and diplomacy. She is the co-author of the monograph *Challenging Citizens: Democratic Innovations at the Local Level* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).

Daniela Ostrá

She teaches at the Department of Politics and European Studies at Palacký University Olomouc. Her research focuses primarily on communication, political marketing, and disinformation. She focuses primarily on research using qualitative methods.

Agnieszka Zogata-Kusz

She works as an assistant professor at the Department of Social Work at Palacký University Olomouc. Her research focuses on global problems, social work with immigrants and refugees, civil society, and Polish politics.

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